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FROM WRECKAGE COMES REASON:
HOW DETROITS CHAPTER 9 FILING HELPS 
DEVELOP A PRACTICABLE AND PRINCIPLED
GOOD FAITH STANDARD 
SCOTT A. KRYSTINIAK
ABSTRACT
The city of Detroit is beginning to rise from the ashes following
decades of fiscal ineptitude, social failure, and corruption.
Bolstered by protections under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code,
Detroit has eliminated billions of dollars in debt and established
a feasible plan for municipal reorganization. Now, Detroit is even
considered an American comeback story. However, Detroits revi-
talization began on a tenuous foundation. The citys creditors ob-
jected vigorously to the bankruptcy petition by claiming that Detroit
had not filed its bankruptcy petition in good faith under § 921(c).
Despite the relatively scarce and imprecise case law and jurispru-
dence surrounding § 921(c), Judge Stephen Rhodes ruled that
Detroit met the good faith requirement in addition to all of the
requirements for Chapter 9 eligibility. In doing so, however, Judge
Rhodes forged a new path in Chapter 9 analysis and established a
practicable and principled good faith test. Now, Judge Rhodess 
approach to § 921(c) good faith can serve as a beacon of reason in
an imprecise area of bankruptcy law.
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staffofthe William & Mary Business Law Review, who made this Note
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INTRODUCTION
Once a thriving metropolisand the backbone ofthe nation,
thecityofDetroitisnow facingunprecedentedsocialandfinancial
hardship. Between 2012 andearly2013, leadershipfrom thecity
of Detroit and the state of Michigan began planning a civil
restructuring to combat the citys destitute condition.1 Shortly
aftertheappointm entofEmergency ManagerKevyn Orrin the
sum merof2013, the city ofDetroitopted forChapter9 bank-
ruptcy afterloose negotiation proceedingsfailed to assuage the
citys abundant creditors.2 Itwas the largestm unicipalbank-
ruptcy filing in United States history, surpassing the previous
recordbyover400 percent.3 Finance experts calculated Detroits 
debtatover$18 billion.4 Over100,000 creditorsclaim ed tohave
a stakein them assivedebt.5 Despiteitsapparenturgency, the
bankruptcyfilingwasstronglycontested bym anyofthesecred-
itors.6 With over100 partiesactively opposing the bankruptcy,
the objections included constitutional challenges and alleged
im proprietyandlackofgoodfaith.7
Theobjectionsbasedon lack ofgood faith provedtobeformi-
dablecontentions.8 Mostoftheaccusationsalleginglack ofgood
1 MonicaDavey& MaryWilliamsWalsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles
Into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013
/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&;MattHelms
& Nathan Bom ey, Detroit Bankruptcy Time Line, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(July14, 2014), http://archive.freep.com/article/20140713/NEWS01/307130100
/detroit-bankruptcy-timeline-DIA [http://perma.cc/D3CU-ZCAF].
2 Davey& Walsh, supra note1.
3 See Aryn McCumber, Beauty and the Beast: The Taxing Tale of the
Detroit Institute of Arts and the Largest Municipal Bankruptcy in History, 40
MI TAX L. 42, 65 (2014). Thepreviousmarkwassetin2011 byJeffersonCounty,
Alabama, withathen-record$4billioninestimateddebt. Id.
4 Helms& Bomey, supra note1.
5 Id.
6 McCumber, supra note3, at43.
7 In re City ofDetroit, 504 B.R. 97, 110 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). Bank-
ruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes noted that 110 parties filed objections to Detroits 
bankruptcyfiling. Id.
8 See generally id. at 18186. Before reaching his decision on Detroits 
good faith, Judge Rhodes took the initiative to consider each of the objectors 
theoriesofbadfaith andthefactualsupportbehindthem. Id.
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faith centered on whetherthe bankruptcy proceedings allowed
Detroits leadership to skirt the citys financial obligations and 
contraveneworkerbenefitsentrusted undertheMichigan State
Constitution.9 In decidingon theseobjections, bankruptcyJudge
Steven Rhodesadopted a rationalefrom severalpreviousChap-
ter9 cases.10 However, Judge Rhodess consideration of the appli-
cable law to supporthis ruling was made much more difficult
because the term  good faith is not defined anywhere within 
Title 11s provisions.11 Furthermore, the case law addressing
§921(c)is m eager in its guidance for subsequentcases.12 De-
spite the relatively scarce and im precise case law and jurispru-
dencesurrounding §921(c), JudgeRhodesruled thatDetroitmet
thegoodfaith requirem entin addition toalloftherequirem ents
forChapter9 eligibility.13
This Note will explore Detroitsbankruptcyproceedingswith
an emphasis on Detroits alleged bad faith in its initial Chapter 9 
bankruptcyfiling. PartI willfirstprovideabackgroundon Chap-
ter9 bankruptcy filingsgenerally, beginning with thepurposes
and historyofmunicipalbankruptcies. Then, PartI willdiscuss
thegood faith petitioning requirem entunder11 U.S.C. §921(c)
anditsrelevantjurisprudence, orlackthereof. PartII willsetthe
9 Nick Carey, Analysis: Constitutional, Good Faith Arguments Unlikely to
Halt Detroit Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2013, 2:26 AM), http://www
.reuters.com/article/2013/08/20/us-usa-detroit-court-analysis-idUSBRE97J05
620130820 [http://perma.cc/T7TE-F3L4].
10 See In re CityofDetroit, 504B.R. at180. In addressingwhetherthecity
ofDetroitfiled itsChapter9 bankruptcy petition in good faith pursuantto
§921(c), JudgeRhodeslooked tonumerouscasestoconstructtheapplicable
law. Thesecasesarediscussedin PartII andPartIII ofthisNote.
11 See Good Faith Standard Required for Confirmation of Chapter 9 Plans,
GOODWIN PROCTOR (2012), http://www.goodwinprocter.com/~/media/82A5B4
B8568B4E239A228D5CB4980745.pdf [http://perma.cc/DUD3-52LN] (The term 
good faith is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and there is lim ited case 
law exploring its m eaning in the context of a Chapter 9 plan.). 
12 Id.
13 Chad Halcom, Judge Rhodes: Detroit Bankruptcy, Filed in Good Faith,
Will Continue, CRAINS DETROIT BUS. (Dec. 3, 2013, 9:46 AM), http://www
.crainsdetroit.com/article/20131203/NEWS/131209960/judge-rhodes-detroit-bank
ruptcy-filed-in-good-faith-will-continue[http://perma.cc/FR6J-YZLE].
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backdrop for Detroits financial history leading up to the bank-
ruptcyfiling, andthenaddressthe§921(c)objectionsindetail.
Finally, PartIII ofthisNotewillhighlighttheapproach Judge
Rhodes took in ruling that Detroits bankruptcy filing was ulti-
matelyconductedin goodfaith. ThisNotewillreason thatJudge
Rhodess analysis on Chapter 9 good faith postulates a pragmatic 
andprincipledexplorationoftheChapter9 goodfaithrequirement
and laysa solid foundation foran 11 U.S.C. § 921(c)analysis.
More specifically, this Note will argue that Judge Rhodess four-
part analysis on good faith Chapter 9 filings creates a new
fram ework thatfillsa void in inconsistentand im preciseChap-
ter 9 bankruptcy law. Now, with the nation held as a captive
audience, Detroits bankruptcy case can be a beacon of reason in 
anebulousareaofbankruptcylaw.
I. BACKGROUND:CHAPTER 9 BANKRUPTCIES
Chapter9 ofTitle11 oftheUnited StatesCodeprovidesthe
statutory m echanism form unicipalitiestofileforbankruptcy.14
Likeotherbankruptcy proceedings, them ain goalofChapter9
bankruptcyistoprotectthefinanciallydistressedentityfrom its
creditors while allowing the entity to restructure its debtwith
the added oversight ofthe judiciary.15 For individuals, bank-
ruptcylaw originatedin parttoprotectcitizensfrom creditorsin
orderto avoid substantialdebtbecoming tantamountto inden-
tured servitude.16 Municipalbankruptcy, on the otherhand, is
designed toallow a m unicipalentitytocontinueitsgovernm en-
talfunctionswhilecivicofficialswork torestructurethemunici-
palitys debt.17 Although criticsremain ferventastothevalueof
14 11 U.S.C. §§ 901946 (2014). These sections m ake up Chapter 9 of the 
BankruptcyCode.
15 Chapter 9: Municipality Bankruptcies, USCOURTS.GOV (2014), http://www
.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx[http:/
perma.cc/KUB8-RXMY]. JustasChapter9 providesthelegalmechanism for
municipalbankruptcy, Chapter11 providescorporationswith an avenuefor
thereorganizationofdebt.
16 See ThomasE. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN.
L. REV. 487, 51618 (1996). 
17 See Chapter 9: Municipality Bankruptcies, supra note15.
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Chapter 9 bankruptcy, and it is often considered a last resort 
forastrugglingmunicipality,18 Chapter9 bankruptcyremainsan
im portantfacetoftheBankruptcyCode.
Asalegalinstitution, bankruptcyisacomplexconglomeration
oflegalprocedure, businesslaw, andconstitutionallaw.19 Chapter
9 bankruptcy is no different.20 In order to provide contextfor
Chapter 9 bankruptcy issues, Section A ofPartI ofthis Note
willprovidefurtherhistoryand background on Chapter9 bank-
ruptcy. Section B willthen discussChapter9 eligibilityrequire-
m entsunder11 U.S.C. §109(c). Finally, Section C willexamine
Chapter 9s good faith filing requirement under 11 U.S.C. § 921(c). 
A. The History of Chapter 9 Bankruptcy
Despite the paucity ofChapter9 bankruptcy filingsin com -
parison to their individualand corporate bankruptcy counter-
parts,21 Chapter9 filingsarestillan emergentfield in both the
businessandthelegalworld.22 In fact, theabilityofam unicipal-
ity to file for bankruptcy only becam e possible during the
1930s.23 TheUnited StatesCongressfirstenacted a law allowing
m unicipalitiestofileforbankruptcyin 1934.24 Despitearticulate
18 Henry C. Kevane, Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy: The New New 
Thing?, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC.:BUS. LAW TODAY (May 2011), http://www
.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2011/05/01_kevane.html [http://perma.cc/TAU7
-J6RN].
19 See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy be an Option
(For People, Places, or Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 221725 (2014). 
20 Id.
21 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States (2012),
http://www.census.gov/library/publications/2011/com pendia/statab/131ed/busi
ness-enterprise.html[http://perma.cc/7V76-UA4V]. According totheAmerican
BankruptcyInstitute, ofmorethan 55,000 municipalentities, fewerthan 600
havefiledforbankruptcyprotection since1937. In comparison, forthetwelve
month period ending June 30, 2007 alone, theAdministrative Officeforthe
U.S. Courtsreported450,332 Chapter7 filings, 5,586 Chapter11 filings, and
23,889 totalbusinessfilings. Id.
22 Om erKimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of
a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 352 (2010).
23 Chapter 9: Municipality Bankruptcies, supra note15.
24 BankruptcyActof1898, Pub. L. No. 251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934).
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drafting, however, onlytwoyearslater, theSupremeCourtheld
thatthelaw wasunconstitutionalin Ashton v. Cameron County
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1.25 Asa federallaw thatheavily
influenced the states ability to oversee its internal affairs, the 
bankruptcyprovision atissuein Ashton raisedstatesovereignty
concerns under the Tenth Amendment.26 This comes as no sur-
prise, asconcernsstem ming from the Tenth Amendmentare a
persistentpointofcontention in Chapter9 filingsand continue
tooccurin bankruptcyfilingstoday.27
In thewakeofAshton, Congressfolloweditsunsuccessfulen-
deavorwith a revised municipalbankruptcy actin 1936.28 The
Suprem eCourtultimatelyruledthatthisiteration wasconstitu-
tionallyperm issibletwoyearslaterin United States v. Bekins.29
ThestatutorystructureofChapter9 bankruptcieswouldrem ain
largelyunchangeduntilthe1970s.30
As m entioned above, Chapter 9 bankruptcy shares sim ilar
goalswith itsindividualandcorporatebankruptcycounterparts.31
However, alargedifferencebetween Chapter9 bankruptcycases
and other types ofbankruptcies is the relative involvementof
the court.32 In allbankruptcy cases, a specialized bankruptcy
court is responsible for overseeing an entitys debt restructur-
ing.33 In corporate or individual bankruptcy cases, the courts 
oversightinvolvesa painstaking review ofa vastnum berofthe
entitys transactions.34 A bankruptcy court m ay also play a
substantialpartin actuallycreatingtherestructuringplan forin-
dividualsand corporations.35 However, thebankruptcycourthas
25 298 U.S. 513, 532 (1936).
26 Id.
27 Kevane, supra note18.
28 BankruptcyActof1989, Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653 (1937).
29 UnitedStatesv. Bekins, 304U.S. 27 (1938).
30 Kimhi, supra note22, at365.
31 Kevane, supra note18.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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a reduced role in Chapter9 cases.36 Generally, the bankruptcy
courtshavetwom ain objectivesin Chapter9 cases.37 First, the
bankruptcy courtwillactasa gatekeeperin thebeginning ofa
municipalbankruptcycase.38 Atthisstage, thebankruptcycourt
will determine a municipalitys Chapter 9 eligibility.39 Thesecond
main objectiveofthebankruptcycourtistoapprovethem unici-
palitys finalized restructuring plan upon the completion of the 
bankruptcyproceedings.40 Furthermore, municipalitiesthemselves
arelefttocreatetheirown restructuringplan.41
Although the bankruptcy courtswillhave a reduced role in
the overallrestructuring schem e, municipalitiesdeem ed Chap-
ter9 eligibleareentitled tocertain specialprotectionsthatare
unique to Chapter9 cases.42 These protectionsare designed to
furtherassistthemunicipalityin continuingitscivicoperations
for the benefit of the public; meanwhile, the municipalitys officials 
can restructure the debt.43 The protections afforded to m unici-
palities generally lim it the ability of creditors to reach the 
municipality.44 For example, in individualor corporate bank-
ruptcy, a creditor may be able to foreclose or repossess a debtors 
assets in order to satisfy the debtors debt. Such an analog is not 
availablein theChapter9 context;amunicipalitys creditor m ay 
notforeclose a civicbuilding in an effortto recuperate itsdebt
becausethebuilding isputtouseforthegeneralpublicwithin
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. The reduced role ofthe judiciary in municipalbankruptcy casesis
groundedinTenthAmendmentconcerns. Id. FormorereadingonTenthAmend-
mentconcernsin Chapter9 cases, see JulietM. Moringiello, Goals and Gover-
nance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 45859 (2014). 
42 Kevane, supra note18.
43 Id.
44 In re MountCarbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999)
([U]nlike Chapter 11 [of the Bankruptcy Act], Chapter 9 cases cannot be in-
voluntarilyinitiated bycreditors;creditorsmaynotproposeaplan;atrustee
cannotbe appointed;and the inability to reorganize cannotresultin liqui-
dation of the m unicipalitys assets under Chapter 7.). 
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them unicipality.45 Furtherm ore, a m unicipalitys debtors cannot 
forcethemunicipalitytoliquidateitsassetsinvoluntarily.46
Some ofthe other protections afforded to m unicipalities in
Chapter9 bankruptciesthatarenotreciprocated in othertypes
ofbankruptciesalsodirectlyreflectthelevelofinvolvementofthe
court. Forexam ple, am unicipalityisnotsubjecttothereporting
duty in which itmustcommunicatetransactionaldata directly to
thebankruptcycourt.47 Thisfreedom isnotreciprocatedin other
types ofbankruptcy.48 Furthermore, a m unicipality is stillaf-
fordedtherighttoborrow andspendwithoutcourtauthority.49
B. Chapter 9 Eligibility Standards Under § 109(c)
Because ofthe added protections and freedoms afforded to
m unicipalitiesin Chapter9 bankruptcy proceedings, one ofthe
main proceduraldifferences between Chapter 9 bankruptcies
and their corporate and individualbankruptcy counterparts is
the threshold a municipality must m eet in establishing its
Chapter 9 eligibility.50 Furthermore, creditors have the added
abilitytochallengesuch eligibility.51 Section 921(c)ofChapter9
is written as ifit bestows upon the judiciary a discretionary
power in dismissing a bankruptcy petition for failing to m eet
this threshold: After any objection to the petition, the court,
after notice and a hearing, m ay dism iss the petition ... ifthe
petition doesnotm eettherequirem ents of this title.52 In prac-
tice, however, courtshavebeen reluctanttointerpret§921(c)so
broadlyand concludethatfailuretomeettheChapter9 eligibil-
ity standards requires m andatory dismissalofthe bankruptcy
45 Moringiello, supra note 41, at 45859. 
46 David G. Heiman, HeatherLennox, LoriSinanyan, Mark K. Sisitsky&
JayantW. Tambe, An Overview of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: Municipal
Debt Adjustments, JONES DAY (Aug. 15, 2010), http://www.jonesday.com
/an-overview-of-chapter-9-of-the-bankruptcy-code-municipal-debt-adjustments
-08-15-2010/[http://perma.cc/57ZB-9W2R].
47 See 11 U.S.C. §1107 (2012).
48 Id.;see also 11 U.S.C. §904(2012).
49 See 11 U.S.C. §904(2012).
50 See Kim hi, supra note 22, at 35657. 
51 See id. at357.
52 11 U.S.C. §921(c)(2012).
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petition.53 Therefore, thepetitioningm unicipalitymustshow by
a preponderanceoftheevidencethatitsatisfieseach ofthefive
elementsunder11 U.S.C. §109(c)in ordertomeettheChapter9
eligibilitythreshold.54
Thefirstelementofeligibilityunder§109(c)mandatesthatan
entityfilingforChapter9 bankruptcymustmeetthedefinitionof
municipality under Title 11.55 Title 11 reads the definition of
municipality as a political subdivision or public agency or instru-
mentality of a state.56 Thisrequirementdoesnotlimittheeligibil-
ity strictly to cities or other localgovernm ents.57 By including
public agency or instrum entality of the state, the Bankruptcy 
Codeallowsentitiessuchasschooldistricts, sanitationresourcepro-
viders, andevenlocalhealthsystemstofileforChapter9 relief.58
The second elem ent for Chapter 9 eligibility is set out in
§109(c)(2)and requiresthe state to authorize the m unicipality
as a debtor under Title 11: 
An entitymaybea debtorunderchapter9 ofthistitleifand
onlyifsuch entity... isspecificallyauthorized, in itscapacity
asamunicipalityorbyname, tobeadebtorundersuch chap-
terbyStatelaw, orbya governmentalofficerororganization
empowered byStatelaw toauthorizesuch entitytobeadebtor
undersuchchapter....59
State authorization is an importantaspectofChapter 9 cases
becauseitcircumventsmanystatesovereigntyissuesarisingfrom
theTenthAmendment.60
53 See Intl Assn of Firefighters, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. 
280, 289 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) ([C]ourts have construed § 921(c) to require 
themandatorydismissalofa petition filed bya debtorwhofailstomeetthe
eligibility requirem ents under § 109(c).); In re Sullivan Cty. Regl Refuse 
Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 83 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (The debtors in the present 
case have failed to establish the requisites for Chapter 9 relief... under
§ 109(c) ... and therefore their petitions m ust be dism issed ....). 
54 Heimanetal., supra note46.
55 11 U.S.C. §109(c)(2012).
56 11 U.S.C. §101(40)(2012).
57 CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 109 (3ded. 2014).
58 Id.
59 11 U.S.C. §109(c)(2)(2012).
60 Moringiello, supra note 41, at 45859. 
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Third, thepetitioningmunicipalitym ustbe insolvent under 
11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3).61 Insolvency isa heightened requirement
thatisnotreciprocatedin non-Chapter9 bankruptcyprovisions.62
Insolvent is defined within the Bankruptcy Code as a financial 
condition whereby a municipality is generally not paying its 
debtsastheybecomedueunlesssuch debtsarethesubjectofa
bona fide dispute or is unable to pay its debts as they becom e 
due.63 Despite this definition, insolvent is still a som ewhat in-
definite term with potentially outcom e-determinative powers.64
However, somecourtshavegonetoconsiderablelengthstoaddress
thishazinessin the past.65 Ultim ately, objectionsbased on the
insolvency requirem ent are substantial weapons in a creditors 
arsenalbecausethey surreptitiously allow creditorstoweigh in
onaChapter9 filingwhilestallingthebankruptcyproceedings66
and ensuring that municipalities are not unduly resorting to
Chapter9 reliefinsteadofoptingforprivaterestructuring.67
61 11 U.S.C. §109(c)(3)(2012).
62 SaraCoelho, Is the Debtor Bankrupt Enough? Application of the Chap-
ter 9 Insolvency Test to the City of Vallejo, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
(Apr. 13, 2011), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/chapter-9/is-the
-debtor-bankrupt-enough-application-of-the-chapter-9-insolvency-test-to-the-city
-of-vallejo/[http://perma.cc/J7ZL-BD8W].
63 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C)(i)(ii) (2012). 
64 See Coelho, supra note62.
65 See generally In re City ofVallejo, 408 B.R. 280 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009).
When the city of Vallejo, California filed for bankruptcy in 2009, the citys cred-
itors argued that the city was not insolvent for purposes of § 109(c)(3). Id.
The bankruptcy court overseeing the case viewed insolvency as a financial 
condition whereby a m unicipalitys cash flow is so restricted that it cannot 
payoffdebtsduewithin thenextyearand stillhavetheflexibilitytouseits
remaining fundstocontinuerequisite municipaloperationsand progresswith
othercreditornegotiations. See id. at 29094. The court ultim ately upheld the 
citys eligibility and a bankruptcy appellate panel from  the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed. Id. at290.
66 See Coelho, supra note62. Even when creditorsfailtogetabankruptcy
petition dismissedforwantofeligibility, Coelhosuggeststhatcreditorsreceive
a tactical advantage just from  contesting a m unicipalitys eligibility because 
eligibility litigation can tie up the bankruptcy proceedings while creditors
seekprivatenegotiationswiththemunicipality. Id.
67 Meagan Costello, Chapter 9 Eligibility: The Test for Insolvency (Part 2 of
3), GOODWIN PROCTOR (Jan. 29, 2013), http://blog.munibk.com/chapter-9-eligi
bility-the-test-for-insolvency-part-2-of-3 [http://perma.cc/Q3FQ-9C7W].
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The fourth element ofChapter 9 eligibility under § 109(c)
requires the petitioning m unicipality to desire[]toeffectaplan
to adjust such debts.68 This requirement is highly subjective 
and corresponds with the good faith filing requirementunder
§921(c), which isaddressed laterin thisNote.69 Essentially, the
petitioning municipality mustillustratethatitsbankruptcy filing
istheresultofanintention torestructureitsdebtratherthan to
evadecreditorsorbuytime.70
Thefinalelem entforChapter9 eligibilityunder§109(c)ad-
dressespre-petitioningnegotiationsbetween themunicipalityand
itscreditors.71 Under§109(c)(5), themunicipality can satisfy the
fifth requirementifitfalls into any offour categories for pre-
petitioning negotiations.72 More specifically, the m unicipality
m ustdem onstratethat(1)ithasreached an agreem entwith its
creditors;(2)ithasnegotiated with itscreditorsin good faith;(3)
negotiationswould be im practicable;or(4)a creditorwould be
able to obtain a preference.73 The categories under § 109(c)(5)
ensurethatChapter9 filingsarenotcapriciousbutstillprovide
Chapter9 bankruptcyasan option form unicipalitiesstruggling
tonegotiatewith creditorsprivately.74
Thefiverequirementsunder§109(c)aremandatoryhurdlesa
municipalityfaceswhenfilingforChapter9 bankruptcy. However,
a municipalitys eligibility does not end with those five require-
m ents. Even ifa m unicipality can meetthe eligibility require-
m entsunder11 U.S.C. §109(c), acreditorcan stillchallengethe
m unicipalitys Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition based on lack of
goodfaith initsfiling.75
68 11 U.S.C. §109(c)(4)(2012).
69 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 900.02[2][d](Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommerseds., 16th ed. 2014).
70 Id. (A statem ent by the m unicipality of its intent to im plem ent a plan 
ofadjustmentcoupled with evidenceofactionstaken and/orbeing taken by
themunicipalityin furtheranceofsuchintentshouldbesufficienttomeetthe
statutory requirem ent.). 
71 11 U.S.C. §109(c)(5)(2012).
72 Id. at (B)(D). 
73 Id.
74 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note69.
75 11 U.S.C. §921(c)(2012).
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C. The Good Faith Filing Requirement
Although someoftherequirementsunder§109(c)touch upon
Chapter 9s good faith filing requirement, theBankruptcy Code
stillexplicitlymandatesthemunicipalitytofileitspetitioningood
faith under§921(c).76 PartI, SectionB ofthisNotecited§921(c)
duetoitsrolein requiringthemunicipality tomeetcertain eligi-
bility thresholds.77 However, in addition to providing thestatu-
tory scaffolding for the court to dismiss Chapter 9 bankruptcy
petitionsbasedon ineligibility, theprovision alsoim posesaduty
on the m unicipality to conductits filing in good faith.78 In its
entirety, § 921(c) reads: After any objection tothepetition, the
court, afternoticeandahearing, maydismissthepetition ifthe
debtor did notfile the petition in good faith or ifthe petition
does not meet the requirem ents of this title.79
Thegood faith filingrequirem entisnotuniquetoChapter9
cases.80 However, therationalebehind §921(c)alsoalignsitself
with someoftheotheruniquerequirementsforChapter9 bank-
ruptcy. Asmentionedbefore, someoftheserequirementsentwine
themselveswith constitutionalissuesunderthe Tenth Amend-
ment.81 The mostcom pelling reason for these requirem ents is
the nature ofthe entity filing forbankruptcy. Asm entioned in
Part I, Section B, both the courts and the creditors roles are 
m inimized com pared to individual and corporate bankruptcy
cases.82 AttheheartofChapter9 bankruptcyistheprotection of
themunicipality forthebenefitoftheciviccommunity. However,
§921(c)oftheBankruptcy Codeisa finalthreshold thata mu-
nicipalitym ustovercome.
76 Id.
77 See supra PartI.B.
78 See 11 U.S.C. §921(c)(2012).
79 Id. (emphasisadded).
80 TheBankruptcyCodeexpressesagood faith filingrequirementin almost
every type ofbankruptcy. To be specific, 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)establishesthe
goodfaith filingrequirementforChapter7 cases. 11 U.S.C. §1112(b), aswell
asawealth ofcaselaw, establishesthegoodfaith filingrequirementforChap-
ter11 cases. The Chapter13 good faith filing requirementiscodified at11
U.S.C. §1307(c).
81 See supra PartI.A;see also Moringiello, supra note 41, at 45859. 
82 See supra PartI.B.
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Section 921(c)ofthe Bankruptcy Code isthe cornerstone of
thisNote. Because§921(c)hasthepotentialtocompletelythwart
amunicipalityfrom successfullyfilingforChapter9 bankruptcy,
it carries a wealth ofstatutory potency.83 Surprisingly, good 
faith the core term  of the provision is not defined anywhere 
within §921(c), noranywhereelsewithin theBankruptcyCode,
despitethisoutcom e-determinativepower. Leftwith littlestatu-
tory guidance, courts have considered the good faith require-
m entunder§921(c)in m yriadways. Despitethesevariousgood
faith practices under § 921(c), there is stillno definitive stan-
dard in the Chapter 9 bankruptcy context. Furthermore, as it
stands, no single good faith adaptation orinterpretation stands
outasparticularlyinstructiveorillustrativein Chapter9 cases.84
TheremainderofPartI, Section C willaddressalternativegood
faithpracticesanddiscussthedifficultiestheypresent.
1. The Chapter 11 Good Faith Test
The mostestablished endeavor to system atize a good faith
testoccursin theChapter11 bankruptcycontext.85 Becausethe
Bankruptcy Code fails to offer a good faith definition, judges 
have used Chapter11 casesto develop a good faith analysis.86
83 See supra PartI.B. SpreadthroughoutChapter9 jurisprudence, however,
courtsandscholarshavenotedthatthediscretionarylanguageof§921(c)does
not callfor the mandatory dismissalofa bankruptcy petition for munic-
ipalitieswhofailtofilethepetition in goodfaith. See In re Cty. ofOrange, 183
B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). See also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note69. However, almostnocaseshavespecificallyaddressedthispermissive
nature. See In re CityofSan Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2013)(stating thatalmostnocaseshaveaddressed thepermissivelanguage
of§ 921(c)in termsofa dismissalrequirementbutrationale regarding the
finality ofa dismissalofa motion todismissthepetition based on bad faith
under § 921(c) sheds light on the judiciarys discretion in dism issing the 
Chapter9 bankruptcypetition). Id. at791.
84 See generally PaulD. Leake, Making the Case for a Good Faith Chapter 
11 Filing, JONES DAY (Dec. 2004), http://www.jonesday.com/newsknowledge
/publicationdetail.aspx?publication=2083 [http://perma.cc/LA7V-4PL7] (Unfor-
tunately, case law guidance on the concept of good faith is often abstruse, 
offeringlittleconcreteguidance, and som etim es contradictory.). 
85 See id.
86 See, e.g., In re Sullivan Cty. Regl Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 80 
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1994).
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SomebankruptcycourtspresidingoverChapter9 caseshavethen
looked totheseChapter11 casesin thepastin ordertograsp a
m eaningful test for § 921(c)s good faith requirement.87 Although
Chapter 11s test has been the basis for Chapter 9 good faith 
determinationsinthepast, noformaladoptionhasoccurred.88
ThetestinChapter11 callsforalargelysubjectivegoodfaith
assessment that evaluates the petitioners bankruptcy filing with 
an eyetoward dism issing thebankruptcy petition for cause.89
IntheseChapter11 cases, thelongstandingtestpresentsadichot-
omy: [t]he test is whether a debtorisattempting to unreason-
ablydeterand harasscreditorsor attemptingtoeffectaspeedy,
efficient reorganization on a feasible basis.90 This testallows
the courts to look into an am algam  of factors,91 butultimately
asks the courts to get into the debtors head and subjectively 
determine the debtors m otives for filing for bankruptcy.92 Be-
cause of this, alleged bad faith is often found when debtors 
attem pttousebankruptcyproceedingsin an efforttoabusethe
judicialprocessfortheirbenefit.93 Likein Chapter9 cases, ifthe
courtdeterm inesthatthedebtorhasfailedtofileitsbankruptcy
petitioningoodfaith, thenthecourtshoulddism issthecase.94
87 See id. at 81 (Determ ining whether a [chapter 11] petition has been 
filed in good faith requires an evaluation of a debtors financial condition, 
m otives, and the local financial realities. These com m ents would appear to be 
equally applicable, at least in part, to a Chapter 9 petition.). 
88 See id.
89 See In re Arnold, 806 F.2d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 1986);In re Marsch, 36
F.3d825, 828 (9thCir. 1994). See also 11 U.S.C. §1112(b)(2012).
90 In re Marsch, 36 F.3dat828 (citingIn re Arnold, 806 F.2dat939).
91 In re Marsch, 36 F.3dat828.
92 See Leake, supra note84.
93 See id.
Bad faith generallyreferstoa chapter11 filingwith thepur-
pose ofabusing the judicialprocess. Forinstance, a chapter
11 filing for the sole purpose offending offlitigation (e.g.,
foreclosure)ifthedebtorhasnorealprospectofreorganizing
itsbusinessisoften foundtoqualifyasthekindofabusethat
risestothelevelofbad faith. Sim ilarly, a filing by a solvent
debtormerely toobtain a tacticallitigation advantagehasalso
beenfoundtobeabusive.
Id.
94 See 11 U.S.C. §1112(b)(2012).
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Although this good faith test proves m ostly sufficient and
equitablein theChapter11 context,95 subsumingthesameChap-
ter11 good faith testto Chapter9 bankruptcies as an official
practiceposesthreesignificantproblems. Theseproblemsoriginate
from thefactthatthe dichotom y derived from Chapter11 case
law presentsan either/orscenarioin which theentirebankruptcy
case sits on a knifes edge. 
Thefirstproblem arisesregardlessofthefactsofthespecific
Chapter 9 case athand or the standard the bankruptcy court
usestoreach itsdetermination. Itarisesbecausecurrentbank-
ruptcy courts are notgiven any statutory guidance on how to
adjudicate the good faith filing requirementand m ustrely on
inconsistentcaselaw orforgetheirown path.96 In such a context,
judgesarefrequentlyaskedtospeculateon theintentionsofthe
95 See Lawrence Ponoroff& F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good
Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW.
U. L. REV. 919, 921, 94647 (1991) ([T]he bankruptcy courts adaptation of 
thegoodfaith doctrinepresentsan excellentexampleofthelaw in evolution,
a processwebelievetobedescribablein meaningfultermsfrom thepositive
law of the cases.). Ponoroff and Knippenberg discuss how Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy cases use the good faith filing requirement to combat corporations
abusing bankruptcy proceedings in orderto solve particularbusiness prob-
lemsorexigenciesthatcannotbe solved through more traditionalbusiness
models. Id. at 921 ([G]ood faith is transform ed from  a tired cliché, invoked in 
suspiciousresponsetoan arrayofnovelfilings, toausefulinstrumentpressed
into service by the courts to bring order and standards to the business of
assuringthatbankruptcypolicyandpurposesevolvein asensible, purposeful
way.). But see RobertJ. Bein, Subjectivity, Good Faith and the Expanded
Chapter 13 Discharge, 70 MO. L. REV. 656, 658 (2005) ([T]he law views sub-
jective determ inations ... as inherently less stable.). In this article, the author 
ultimately arguesfora mix ofboth subjective and objective analysisin de-
termininggood faith;however, healsohighlightsdifficultiesofan inherently
subjectiveanalysis. Id. at 685 (The law m ust be sufficiently objective as to be 
predictablesothatindividualscan ordertheiraffairswith someconfidencein
how theywillbetreatedbythelaw. Withoutobjectivity, thelaw devolvesinto
disorder. (footnote om itted)). 
96 In thecontextofChapter7 bankruptcies, theEighth Circuithasechoed
concerns that the lack of a statutory basis for good faith will be employed as 
aloosecannonwhichistobepointedin thedirection ofadebtorwhosevalues
do not coincide precisely with those of the court. In re Huckfeldt, 39 F.3d
829, 832 (8th Cir. 1994)(citing In re Latimer, 82 B.R. 354, 364 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1988)).
2016] FROM WRECKAGE COMES REASON 251
bankruptcy petitioners.97 Leaving such an unrestrained oppor-
tunity for unilateraljudicialdiscretion has raised red flags in
the past, and these concernsare found in many typesofbank-
ruptcylaw.98 In fact, Congressresponded toalack ofuniformity
in bankruptcy casesin thenottoodistantpastwhen itcreated
theBankruptcyAbusePrevention and Consum erProtection Act
of2005.99 In ordertocurbpotentialprejudicesand raisejudicial
accountabilityin thebankruptcycontext, somescholarsadvocate
forfurtherlegislativeactivism.100 However, afittingpieceoflegis-
lation hasyettosolvethisproblem, and the particularissueof
lackofstatutoryguidancewith regardto§921(c)islikelytopersist
untiltheBankruptcy Codeisamended, ora single, unified test
becomesawidelyacceptedstandardforfuturecases.
Thesecond problem isthattheChapter11 testcould result
in toolightaburden formunicipalitiestom eetwhen petitioning
for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. The thrustofthe Chapter 11 good
faith filinganalysisistom akesure that the debtors m otives are 
not antithetical to the basic purposes of bankruptcy.101 Mean-
while, challenging a m unicipalitys good faith is only one of a 
verylimitednumberofopportunitiesthatacreditorhastocombat
a municipal bankruptcy due to the municipalitys protections 
underChapter9.102 Therefore, ifcreditorsare only lefttochal-
lenge a Chapter9 bankruptcy petition based on the argum ent
thatthem unicipalityhasfileditspetition forreasonsadverseto
the basic purposes ofbankruptcy, then creditor-objectors may
repeatedly fail to have a m unicipalitys Chapter 9 petition 
dism issed.103 Thisfailureisalikelyresultbecausemunicipalities
97 See Bein, supra note95, at658.
98 In re Huckfeldt, 39 F.3dat832. See also Bein, supra note95, at658.
99 KaraJ. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L.J. 174, 189
(2012). BAPCPA was signed into law alm ost a decade ago with an im petus 
tostream linetheadministration ofbankruptcycases. Thenew statutorypro-
visions created enhanced statutory standards for bankruptcy professionals to
meetwhenattemptingtorestructuredebt. Id.
100 Bein, supra note95, at658.
101 See Leake, supra note84.
102 In re MountCarbonMetro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 33 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999).
103 See In re CityofSan Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776, 788 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 2013). In thiscase, thecourtconcluded thatitwasenough toshow proper
intent for Chapter 9 bankruptcy by taking an affirm ative step to file chapter 9 
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havean inherentpowertoarguethattheChapter9 bankruptcy
petition wasfiled sothatthem unicipality can continueitscivic
functions while benefiting from Chapter 9 protection from its
creditors.104 IftheChapter11 testofpeeking intothemindsof
the petitioner is the test used in Chapter 9 cases, then civic
officials willlikely be able to preemptgood faith challenges by
showingtheiraspirationstokeep amunicipalityrunning, despite
both well-grounded and ardentpressuresfrom itscreditors, and
actualbadfaithin them unicipalitys subjective intentions.105
Finally and in contrast to makingthegoodfaith petitioning
requirement too easy the third problem  is that Chapter 11s 
good faith test could afford creditor-objectors an unbridled
opportunity to thwart a municipal debtors Chapter 9 bankruptcy 
attem pt. This was a prim ary concern in Detroits bankruptcy 
case.106 In thealternativetothesecond problem above, thisthird
problem could resultwheneverthecourthasthecapability tode-
terminewhetherthedebtorisusingthebankruptcyproceedings
in any way inconsistentwith an efficient reorganization on a 
feasible basis. Again, challenging a municipalitys good faith 
filingisoneofthefew safeguardscreditor-objectorsaregiven in
a Chapter9 bankruptcy case.107 However, as mentioned previ-
ously, §921(c)hasoutcom e-determinativepowerandthisallows
thatitcould restructure the debtand impairthe creditors as necessary to
achieve a balanced budget. Id.
104 See id.;see also In re Sullivan Cty. Regl Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 
60, 82 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994). In In re Sullivan, thecourtdismissed thebank-
ruptcy petition because the m unicipality presented no evidence of any 
meaningfuldiscussion of[sic]whattypeofplan mightbeappropriateunder
Chapter 9. Id. ThissuggeststhatevenamenialeffortindiscussingaChapter9
wouldjustifyfilingforChapter9 bankruptcy. Id.
105 See generally In re RavennaMetro. Dist., 522 B.R. 656, 684(Bankr. D.
Colo. 2014). Thiscaseseemstosuggestthatthegoodfaith requirementunder
§ 921(c)is likely to be metifthe petitioning municipality can articulate a
threat to the health and well-being ofthe citizens. Id. Because providing
servicesiswithin the purview ofmunicipalities and they can controlthese
services, almost any municipality facing budget issues could articulate a
threattothehealth andwell-beingofthecitizensbystatingthattheservices
areinjeopardy.
106 In re CityofDetroit, 504B.R. 97, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
107 In re MountCarbonMetro. Dist., 242 B.R. at33.
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creditor-objectorstheopportunity tohavea Chapter9 casedis-
missed.108 Therefore, acreditor-objectorneed onlyshow thatthe
m unicipalityhastaken actionsthatarenotdirected towardsan
efficient reorganization on a feasible basis and the bankruptcy 
courtcoulddismisstheChapter9 petition, even iftheChapter9
filing wasonsetby the properpurposesand bankruptcy isthe
m ostadequatelegalrem edyforthem unicipality.
TheChapter11 good faith testultimately provestooim pre-
cise and either too accom modating or harsh for the municipal
bankruptcy context, depending on the specificcircumstancesof
thecase. Overall, a Chapter11 analogy isan im practicableand
misguided prospectfora unified Chapter9 good faith analysis.
Although a void exists in Chapter 9s good faith jurisprudence, 
the void likely willnotfind an adequate substitute in itsindi-
vidualorcorporatebankruptcybrethrenunderChapter11.
2. Other Alternative Tests for Chapter 9 Good Faith
Without a formal test to draw from , courtshaveapproached
Chapter9 casesinamultitudeofways. In somecases, bankruptcy
courts merely take a cursory glance into the m unicipalitys good 
faith filing requirement.109 However, bankruptcy courts have
alsotaken am oreholisticapproach in previousChapter9 bank-
ruptcy cases and considered many important aspects that fre-
quentlyarisein goodfaith filingchallenges.110
108 See supra PartI.B.
109 See In re PleasantView Util. Dist., 24 B.R. 632, 639 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1982);In re Vills. atCastle Rock Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. 76, 81
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1990). In thesecases, thecourtsdonoteven provideabasis
for§921(c)eligibility, yettheybothstillciteitasm andatoryauthority.
110 See In re Cityof San Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776, 790 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 2012) (As in m any other considerations of good faith in the context of 
bankruptcy, thetestisatotalityofthecircumstanceswheretheCourtisgiven
the powerto weigh the numerousfactorsin lightofthe circumstancesasa
whole in determining whether good faith is lacking.); In re Mount Carbon
Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. at 4041: 
Borrowing from thegood faithanalysis of Chapter 11 and
Chapter13, itiseasy toconcludethattheCourtshould con-
sider the totality ofthe circumstances. The factors which a
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Whilesom ecourtswillim putetheChapter11 goodfaith test
into a Chapter 9 case, some ofthe jurisprudence surrounding
Chapter 9s good faith requirementmerelypayshomagetoChap-
ter 11s dichotomous test.111 Perhapsthe m ostpermeating con-
sideration is the bankruptcy courts willingness to inquire into 
theintentofthebankruptcypetitioner.112 Asseen in Chapter11,
thisconsideration isnotasignificantbreakthrough in Chapter9
good faith analysis butillustrates the importance ofthe bank-
ruptcy petitioners m otives and goals in its filing. Overall, for 
reasonssimilartothedifficultyofapplyingthisinquiryin Chap-
ter11 cases, determiningthesubjectivem otivesofthepetitioning
m unicipalityaloneisalargelyunpersuasivetestthatm akesthe
proceedingsverydifficultforboththebenchandopposingparties.
WhilemanyChapter9 casesfacetiouslydancearoundChapter
11s good faith test, some cases go well beyond the simple either/or 
analysisthattheChapter11 testmandates.113 Today, manyschol-
ars and opinions cite Colliers bankruptcy resources as the m ost 
unifiedcollectionofChapter9 goodfaithanalysis.114 Itreads:
Courtshould examinein each chapterinclude:(1)whethera
plan comports with the provisions and purpose ofthe Code
andthechapterunderwhichitisproposed, (2)whetheraplan
isfeasible, (3)whetheraplan isproposedwithhonestyand sin-
cerity, and (4) whether a plans term s or the process used to 
seekitsconfirmationwasfundamentallyfair.
111 See In re PleasantView Util. Dist., 24B.R. at639;In re Vills. atCastleRock
Metro. Dist. No. 4, 145 B.R. at81. In thesecases, thecourtsdonoteven provide
abasisfor§921(c)eligibility, yettheybothstillciteitasmandatoryauthority.
112 See In re City of San Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776, 78991 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 2013);In re N.Y. City Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 28081 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010);In re Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 72021 
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009);In re Cty. ofOrange, 183 B.R. 594, 608 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1995). Allthesecasescitetheinquiry intothesubjectiveintentof
themunicipalitywhenfilingforChapter9.
113 See id.
114 See In re City of San Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. at 78586; In re N.Y.
CityOff-Track BettingCorp., 427 B.R. at274;In re PierceCty. Hous. Auth.,
414 B.R. at714;In re Cty. ofOrange, 183 B.R. at608. Thesefourcasescite
Colliers when determ ining § 921(c)s requirem ents.
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Thefactsthatmayberelevantin agoodfaith inquiryinclude
(i) the debtors subjective beliefs; (ii) whether the debtors fi-
nancialproblems fallwithin the situations contemplated by
chapter9;(iii)whetherthedebtorfiled itschapter9 petition
forreasonsconsistentwith thepurposesofchapter9;(iv)the
extent of the debtors prepetition negotiations, if practical; (v) 
theextentthatalternativestochapter9 wereconsidered;and
(vi) the scope and nature of the debtors financial problem s.115
Much of the language in Colliers is subsum ed from Chapter 
11 analysis.116 However, even with six factors for bankruptcy
courtstoconsider, thereisstillnoinstructiveimpetusfordealing
with § 921(c)s concerns. Without more specificity, judges continue 
towield unbridled powerwhen dealing with bankruptcy cases.117
Because ofthis, the basicconcerns associated with the judges 
discretionarypowerin otherbankruptcycontextsarereciprocated
in Colliers take on Chapter 9s § 921(c) good faith requirement.118
Overall, courtshavenotshied awayfrom imputingathorough
analysisforChapter9 good faith. Somecourtshavegonetogreat
lengthsby analogizing Chapter9 casesto Chapter11 cases.119
Theyhaveexploredam ultitudeofanalyses, such aslookinginto
theintentofthebankruptcypetitionertofindgoodorbadfaith,120
aswellasotherfact-intensiveconsiderationssuch asthosefound
in Colliers Chapter 9 good faith scheme.121 However, thisholistic
approachhasnotbeenmethodizedorwidelyadopted. Eventhough
theChapter9 goodfaith analysishasfound somewhatreasonable
footing in these pastcases, none ofthe previousanalyseshave
proven to be a viable, definitive standard ortestgoing forward.
Nonehavestood outtobetheholisticapproach worthyofwide-
spread adoption. However, Detroits bankruptcy case can fill the 
115 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note69.
116 Both Colliers schem e (in particular, item s (i)(iii)) and the Chapter 11 
goodfaithtestaregroundeduponviewingthesubjectiveintentofthedebtor.
117 Bein, supra note95.
118 See id.
119 See infra PartII.C.
120 Id. See also In re City of San Bernardino, Cal., 499 B.R. 776, 78991 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013);In re N.Y. City Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R.
256, 28081 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R.
702, 72021 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009); In re Cty. ofOrange, 183 B.R. 594, 608
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
121 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note69.
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void left by Congresss silence in addressing § 921(c)s good faith 
requirement. In order to understand both how Detroits case can 
be theleading and preeminentguide forfuturecases, and how
thecourthandledthecomplexitiesassociated with Detroits Chap-
ter 9 bankruptcy filing, an overview of Detroits financial history 
leadinguptoandincludingitsbankruptcyispertinent.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF DETROITS BANKRUPTCY
To some extent, Detroits financial distress was largely fore-
seeable.122 JudgeRhodesopined thatbecauseDetroitfacedsuch
overwhelm ingfiscalexigency, even theobjectingcreditorsknew
that the Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing was ultimately a foregone 
conclusion.123 The origins of the citys anguish can be traced 
through the last seven decades of Detroits history.124 Thishistory,
however, demonstratesthatnosingularpersonalityoreventled
totheultimatefinancialdownturn. Indeed, manyfactorsgaverise
to Detroits downward spiral.125
Part II, Section A of this Note will discuss Detroits financial 
historypriortothebankruptcyfiling. Section B willexplorethe
timeperioddirectlyin linewith Detroits Chapter 9 filing. Finally, 
Section C willprovide an overview of Detroits Chapter 9 eligi-
bility and the challenges raised by the citys creditors. 
A. Detroit in the Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Century
Therewasalongperiodin American historywhen thecityof
Detroitseemed infallible.126 Riding alongsidethesuccessesofthe
boom ing auto industry, Detroitblossom ed in the early yearsof
the twentieth century.127 In fact, the firstseven decadesofthe
122 Nathan Bomey & John Gallagher, A Free Press Investigation: How
Detroit Went Broke, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 15, 2013).
123 In re CityofDetroit, 504B.R. 97, 176 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
124 Bomey& Gallagher, supra note122.
125 See Amy Padnani, Anatomy of Detroits Decline, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/17/us/detroit-decline.html
?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/NQ8Z-SL9P].
126 Bomey& Gallagher, supra note122.
127 SCOTT MARTELLE, DETROIT:A BIOGRAPHY 95 (2012).
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twentieth century earm arked theswiftriseofDetroitasa rich,
prosperouscity.128
Detroits climb to the upper strata of Am erican society stem s 
from its role as the birthplace and hotbed formuch ofthe na-
tions industrialization.129 Theriseofautom obilemanufacturing
at the turn ofthe twentieth century predicated this boom in
industry.130 In 1908, FordMotorCom panyintroducedtheModel
T.131 Henry Ford then announced the five-dollar workday in
1914.132 Subsequent to these two events, Ford produced and
distributed over15 million ModelTs133 and Detroits population 
exploded, eventually becoming the fourth largest city in the
United States.134 Suddenly, Detroitcould offera livablewageto
justaboutanyone.
Bolstered by thisindustrialinflux, Detroiteven m anaged to
enduretheGreatDepression. In the1930s, formerDetroitMayor
Frank Murphy stated: [Detroit] is a great, rich city   it has 
neverrepudiated an obligation nor defaulted upon a debt and 
it never will.135 Mayor Murphys words m ostly rang true as the 
city survived the Great Depression without a totaleconomic
collapse, although itdid come with greathardship.136 Automo-
bilesalesplunged duetolack ofconsumerism.137 Jobswerecut,
taxeswentunpaid, and the population fluctuated.138 Due to its
lack ofrevenue, thecity itselffaced such greathardship thatit
paid policemen, teachers, and othercivicworkersin promissory
128 Bomey& Gallagher, supra note122.
129 JoelKurth, MikeWilkinson& LouisAguilar, Special ReportSix decades 
in Detroit: How abandonment, racial tensions and financial missteps bank-
rupted the city, DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.detroitnews.com
/article/20131004/METRO01/310040001 [http://perm a.cc/5S3J-49WS].
130 MARTELLE, supra note127.
131 HENRY FORD & SAMUEL CROWTHER, MY LIFE AND WORK (2008). See also
Kurth, Wilkinson & Aguilar, supra note129. In thearticle, long-timeDetroit
city residents describe their m em ories of looking back into Detroits past and 
seeingaUtopia.
132 FORD & CROWTHER, supra note131.
133 Id.
134 Bomey& Gallagher, supra note122.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
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notes, then known as scripts.139 The city struggled, butthere
wasatleastan interm ediateendin sightwhen thenation would
calluponDetroitforhelp.140
ThecityofDetroitfoundanew purposewiththeonsetofWorld
WarII.141 Eventually, thecitycom pletelyshutdown comm ercial
autom obilemanufacturing and began manufacturing tanksand
airplanes for the Allied forces.142 Jobs that had evaporated
during the Great Depression becam e available again and the
industrialboom ofWorldWarII broughtnewfoundprosperityto
thecityofDetroit.143 The economy stabilized and the citys popula-
tion settled.144 Soon afterthewar, Detroitagain becamethehub
forAmerican autom anufacturing.145 In fact, theU.S. Censusof
1960 revealed thatDetroithad thehighestper-capita incomeof
anyAmerican cityatthetim e.146
While Detroitmaintained itsfiscalopulence throughoutthe
majorityofthetwentieth century, thecityalsofacedsocialillsand
drug issues that threatened the citys populace as well as its 
prosperity.147 Although m uch ofthe nation endured egregious
hardshipsbroughton byracetensions, Detroitmayhavesuffered
the worstofit. Finally, in 1967, police invaded an unlicensed
speakeasy operated by African Am ericans, and a ruinous riot
erupted and left43 dead, 1,189 injured, and 2,000 buildingsde-
stroyed.148 The violence would continue and eventually cause
manyfamiliesandindividualstomoveoutofthecity.149 Thecity
also suffered from the prevalence ofdrugs.150 According to the
139 DETROIT PUB. LIBRARY, WARTIME DETROIT:THE ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY,
http:/web.archive.org/web/20070901171535/http:/www.detroit.lib.mi.us/Golden
JubileeExhibit/GJ%20WEB/II_Wartime_Detroit.htm [http://perma.cc/MUW2
-5EPR].
140 See id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 MARTELLE, supra note127.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 Detroit is Dying Quickly, FREAKONOMICS (Mar. 23, 2011), http://freako
nomics.com/2011/03/23/detroit-is-dying-quickly/[http:/perma.cc/BK26-AKTD].
147 Kurth, Wilkinson& Aguilar, supra note129.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
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DetroitNews, theabuseofcrack cocaineservedasacatalystfor
illnessand violence.151 Both hospitaladmittancesand crimerates
rosedramatically.152 Detroitbecameknown asthemurdercapital
ofAmerica.153
In addition to a plague of social decay, Detroits steady de-
clinewouldcontinueasthecityfellvictim tostunningfiscallosses
during the 1970s.154 As war broke outin the Middle East in
1973, gaspricesspiked.155 TheDetroiteconom y, which wasbut-
tressed by gas-guzzling autom obiles, faced an uphillbattle.156
Meanwhile, foreign autom akerswerefinding new footing in the
automobileindustryandthreatenedtheAm erican autoindustry
with com pleteobsolescence.157 NotablejournalistPeterHitchins
wrote that the U.S. car industry lost the confidence even of 
patriotic Americans, and has never fully regained it.158
BecauseDetroitrelied soheavilyon thissingleindustry, the
autoindustrywould remain acommon indicatorofthedifficulties
ahead. Duringthe1980sand 1990s, theMichigan autoindustry
faced an imm ensedownturn.159 Tradeagreementswereputinto
place thatostensibly allowed Am erican manufacturersto leave
the country in favor of foreign countries.160 Therefore, when
these and many other economic and industrial trends left Detroits 
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Peter Hitchins, From Motown to Ghost Town: How the Once Mighty
Detroit is Heading Down a Long, Slow Road to Ruin, DAILY MAIL (July 9,
2011), http://www.dailym ail.co.uk/news/article-2012971/From-Motown-Ghost
-town-How-mighty-Detroit-heading-long-slow-road-ruin.html[http://perma.cc
/U659-CXJZ].
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 See Richard N. Block & DaleL. Belm an, Automotive and Other Manu-
facturing Industries in Michigan: Output, Employment, Earnings, and Collective
Bargaining, 19802001, in MICHIGAN AT THE MILLENNIUM 145 (Charles L.
Ballard et al. eds., 2003) (providing an in-depth analysis of Michigans eco-
nom icstatureduringthelastfew decadesofthetwentiethcentury).
160 See Barry Lynn, How Detroit Went Bottom-Up, THE AMERICAN PROS-
PECT (Sept. 19, 2009), http://prospect.org/article/how-detroit-went-bottom [http:/
perma.cc/SN2T-WWZ5].
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autoindustryin aprecariousposition, thecity, too, founditselfon
hardtim es.
Finally, General Motorss Rick Wagoner, Fords Alan Mulally, 
Chryslers Robert Nardelli, and the president of the United Auto 
WorkersUnion, Ron Gettelfinger, petitioned fora bailoutfrom
Congressin2008.161 SittingbeforetheSenateBankingCommittee,
the corporate executives could notmuster logicalor precise an-
swerswhen confrontedwith whatwouldotherwisebeconsidered
fairly straightforward questions.162 At one point, Senator Bob
Corker of Tennessee retorted, I just want the numbers!163 Unsur-
prisingly, the auto executives came back to the city ofDetroit
empty-handed. After continued efforts to assuage Congresss 
concerns, allbutFord would partakein a bailoutfunded by the
U.S. Treasury.164 The woesofthe auto industry prefaced what
wastocomeofthecity.165
B. Detroits Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Filing 
Despite the absence ofone singulareventorpersonality in
Detroits history that led to the citys financial collapse, there 
were stillpivotaldecisionsand circum stancesthathastened or
altogether ensured the downward spiral.166 While the reliance
on theautoindustry certainly did not help Detroits chances of 
successattheturn ofthetwenty-firstcentury, manyofthem ore
overwhelmingdifficultiesthecityfaced stemmed from the citys 
poorleadership.167
161 CHARLIE LEDUFF, DETROIT:AN AMERICAN AUTOPSY 82 (2013).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Kim berly Amadeo, Auto Industry Bailout (GM, Ford, Chrysler):Why
the Big 3 Needed a Bailout and What It Cost the U.S. Taxpayer, US ECONOMY
(Dec. 21, 2014), http://useconomy.about.com/od/criticalssues/a/auto_bailout.htm
[http://perma.cc/3CZC-XY42].
165 Padnani, supra note125.
166 Id.
167 See Bomey& Gallagher, supra note122. Oneofthefrequentchallenges
Detroits leadership faced was trying to balance a budget and m ake cuts that 
favorlong-term reliefbutadverselyaffectshort-term gains. Few, ifany, were
willingtorisetomeetthesechallenges. Id.
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Detroits civic leadership has a storied past.168 Whilesom eof
Detroits mayors such as Hazen Pingree and Frank Murphy
willgodown in history assomeofthebestthenation hasever
seen, many otherswillalsogo down assom e ofthe mostinept
and corrupt.169 Outofthese ineptand corruptmayors, Kwame
Kilpatrick, iswidely regarded asthe worstofthem.170 Because
Detroitfaced a plethoraofissuesthatwentback m anydecades,
KwameKilpatrickshouldnotbesingledoutasthelonereason for
Detroits affliction.171 However, hislegacyservesasamicrocosm
oftheanguish anddespairthatbefellDetroit.
During Kwame Kilpatricks tim e in office, thecity ofDetroit
was already feeling the oppressive approach ofbankruptcy.172
However, in an efforttoevadetotalfinancialcollapse, Kilpatrick
made decisionsthatfavored short-term acquiescence overlong-
term strategy.173 In acrim e-ridden city, Kilpatrick cutthepolice
forcebyover25 percent.174 Healsoreducedthenumberofpolice
precincts, which resulted in an exponentialincrease in police
responsetim e.175 Thecom bination ofthesedecisionsessentially
madethecityunlivableformany. Although theexodusawayfrom
Detroithad started decadesearlier, thepopulation continued to
dwindle as Detroit lost even m ore ofits tax revenue.176 The
faultsofKwameKilpatrick werem any, butthemajorissuewas
thathehad favoredshort-term relief over long-term  strategy a 
168 Dan Austin, Meet the 5 Worst Mayors in Detroit History, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (July 23, 2014), http:/www.freep.com/article/20140723/OPINION/3072
30054/Meet-5-worst-mayors-Detroit-history[http://perma.cc/J4KE-84FA].
169 Id.
170 Id. (Kilpatrick is more culpable and his conduct more pervasive than 
any otherpubliccorruption defendantsentenced in recentm em ory, federal 
prosecutors said. The scale of his corruption was astonishing. The im pact on 
the region was devastating.). 
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. The author notes that Detroits police force went from  4,200 officers 
to3,000 officers. Id.
175 Id.
176 See Editors Note: The Harris Manifesto, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Apr. 27,
2005), http:/www.metrotimes.com/detroit/the-harris-manifesto/Content?oid=218
1304[http://perma.cc/R845-2MFX].
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strategy that exacerbated Detroits financial condition.177 The
majorconsequenceofthisfailed reliefwasthatthecityofDetroit
facedunprecedentedmunicipaldebtwithnowaytopayitback.178
The breaking point for Detroits indebtedness occurred in 
early 2013. From  1998 to 2012, politicians from  Michigans state 
government, seated in Lansing, cut Detroits state-shared 
revenue by 48 percent and withheld $172 million from the
city.179 Duetotheserevenuecutsandthelossessufferedfrom the
reduction of its tax base, Detroit leadership including Kwam e 
Kilpatrick began to reallocate funds in order to m eet short-term 
obligations.180 However, theseresponsesfurtherexacerbatedthe
citys destitute condition.181 Most of Detroits indebtedness arose 
from unfunded pension benefitstopreviouscivicemployeesand
health care liabilities for em ployees pastand present.182 Over
half of the citys budget was consumed by these legacy costs.183
Thesedebtholdershad been shoved aside, despite othercorner-
cuttingstrategiesbyDetroitleadership.184 Theleveesoon broke.
In thesumm erof2013, Kevyn Orr, a prom inentbankruptcy
attorney at Jones Day, was appointed as the city of Detroits emer-
gency managerin a heavily contested situation thatbroughtto
lightmanystateconstitutionalconcerns.185 Theappointmentalso
177 Id.
178 Bob Adelmann, Detroits Bankruptcy Plan Reveals Fraud in Funding 
Pensions, THE NEW AMERICAN (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.thenewamerican.com
/usnews/crime/item/17591-detroit-s-bankruptcy-plan-reveals-fraud-in-funding
-pensions[http://perma.cc/3NNP-JJPE]. Thisarticlesuggeststhateven when
Kwame Kilpatrick did try to address the pension liabilities, he did so by clever 
legal circum vention that allowed the city to exceed its debt lim it. Id.
179 See Bomey& Gallagher, supra note122.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 See CharlieLeDuff, The Americans with Charlie LeDuff: Detroits Bank-
ruptcy is Helping Police Do Their Jobs, YOUTUBE (June26, 2014), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=zOWG8Xq3dZA [http://perm a.cc/3EBQ-KY38].
184 Austin, supra note168.
185 MonicaDavey& MaryWilliamsWalsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles
Into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES (July18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19
/us/detroit-files-for-bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2& [http://perma.cc/5X
RA-4YGZ].
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called intoquestion thelegitim acy ofstatelawsthatwerethen
recently passed with theintention offueling a push forDetroit
to file for bankruptcy. In the end, the Michigan leadership,
spearheaded by the effortsofGovernorSnyderand Em ergency
ManagerOrr, opted forChapter9 bankruptcyin afinaleffortto
savethecity.
C. Detroits Chapter 9 Eligibility 
In some ways, Detroits financialhistory isanalogoustothe
historiesofmanyotherbankruptmunicipalentities. Detroitcer-
tainly was not the first municipality to face bankruptcy in
responsetoinsurm ountabledebtwroughtby a m ultitudeofad-
verse conditions.186 For example, Detroits predecessor in the 
record booksforlargestmunicipalbankruptcy, Jefferson Coun-
ty, Alabama, also had millions if not billions in debt accrued 
through similar debtissuances, such as municipalbonds and
retirementandhealthcareservicesrenderedtopastandcurrent
civicemployees.187 However, Detroitisa uniquecase, especially
in its m agnitude. With its debtcalculated som ewhere between
$18 and $20 billion,188 Em ergency ManagerKevyn Orrand the
financial managers team had to move quickly in orderto stop
the bleeding. Subsequently, Orr imm ediately initiated prepeti-
tion bankruptcyproceedings.189
The Honorable Judge Stephen Rhodes, sitting on the bench
forthebankruptcycourtfortheEastern DistrictofMichigan, was
assigned Detroits caseatthetriallevel.190 Hisfirstassignment
was to rule on Detroits Chapter 9 eligibility under 11 U.S.C 
§109(c).191 Thistask wasthe beginning ofwhatwastobecome
an arduousprocessofweeding through stateconstitutionallaw
186 MaryWilliamsWalsh, In Alabama, a County That Fell Off the Financial
Cliff, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2012), http:/www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/business
/jefferson-county-ala-falls-off-the-bankruptcy-cliff.html?pagewanted=all [http://
perma.cc/K7HH-9TCR].
187 Id.
188 Helms& Bomey, supra note1.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
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andbankruptcylaw whilealsom anagingtheoutward challenge
of a vast number of creditors who actively contested Detroits 
eligibility. Despitethisadded difficulty, JudgeRhodesultim ate-
ly ruled in favor of Detroits Chapter 9 eligibility.192 Forthem ost
part, Judge Rhodes gracefully considered the creditors arguments 
forineligibility butcam edown firm on why Detroitm aintained
itseligibilityunder§109(c).193
The m ost pertinent conclusions reached in Judge Rhodess 
§ 109(c) analysis were (1) that Detroits prepetition negotiations 
wereconductedin goodfaith;194 and (2) that Detroit desire[d] to 
effect a plan to adjust such debts.195 Thesedeterminationswould
play a continued role later in Judge Rhodes opinion, in which he 
tackled Detroits good faith filingrequirementunder§921(c).196
In addition to challenges under § 109(c), Detroits creditor-
objectors took issue with the petition being filed in good faith
under§921(c).197 JudgeRhodesnoted thatsomeoftheseobjec-
tionsmayhavebeenbroughtonbypotentiallyvalidfindingsstem-
ming from im portantconcerns.198 However, had Judge Rhodes
considered these objections without looking at the petitions 
broader context, Detroits creditor-objectors could have thwarted 
the citys only reasonable means of recovery. Judge Rhodes could 
haveonlylookedattheintentandactionsofthosefilingthepeti-
tion or adopted the basic Chapter 11 test. Furtherm ore, the
court could have sim ply decided on the creditor-objectors claim 
thatEmergency ManagerOrrand GovernorSnyderacted with
impropriety in the first place. In both ofthese circumstances,
which were used in other Chapter 9 cases, Detroits chances of 
recovery could have been lost. Instead, Judge Rhodesappropri-
ately viewed Detroits circumstances wholly to decide the § 921(c) 
and § 109(c)eligibility thresholds, in lightofthe possibility of
validconcernsraisedbythecreditor-objectors.199
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(2012);In re City ofDetroit, 504 B.R. 97, 110
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
195 11 U.S.C. §109(c)(4)(2012);In re CityofDetroit, 504B.R. at172.
196 In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 17989. 
197 Id. at112.
198 See id. at187.
199 See id. at 18789. 
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III. DETROITS BANKRUPTCY PETITION AND THE §921(C)
GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT
In the lastsection ofIn re Detroit, Judge Rhodesaddressed
Detroits good faith filing requirement under § 921(c).200 By this
point, JudgeRhodeshad alreadyruled thatGovernorSnyderand
Emergency ManagerOrrdid notviolate Michigan state consti-
tutionalconcerns.201 Adding on to this, Judge Rhodes convinc-
inglyarrived attheconclusion thatDetroithad sufficientlymet
§ 921(c)s good faith petitioning requirem ent.202 However, Judge
Rhodesused considerable tactnotonly toaddressthe creditor-
objectors claims but also to address the good faith requirement 
in lightofcircum stancesnottraditionallyprescribed by§921(c)
caselaw.203 Whathe arrived atwasa m ore com plete and thor-
ough analysisoftheissuesimplicated under§921(c).204 Bydoing
so, Judge Rhodes carved a path for a m ore practicable and
principledgoodfaith analysis. However, JudgeRhodeshadtogo
togreatlengthstoputthisanalysistogether.
The creditor-objectors (m any ofwhom were represented by
some ofthe best attorneys in the country)brought up every
instancepossiblein ordertoshow thatDetroithadpetitionedfor
Chapter9 bankruptcyin badfaith.205 Indeed, JudgeRhodesnoted
dozensoftestimonialsthatalleged improprietyin allstageslead-
ing up to the bankruptcy.206 Forexample, unions representing
Detroits police and firefighters argued one of the Citys express 
purposes... istoattem pttousetheseChapter9 proceedingsto
illegally im pairthe constitutionally protected pension rightsof
employees and retirees.207 However, thisargument, aswellas
200 Id. at 17989. 
201 See id. at 15467. 
202 See id. at 17989. 
203 Melissa B. Jacoby, The Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-Eligibility, 41 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 849, 853 (2014) (The written decision finding Detroit eligible for 
Chapter9 respondedtoaremarkablenum ber of objections in detail.). 
204 Id. at 865 ([W]hat happens in this bankruptcy could set a blueprint for 
future m unicipal cases.). 
205 See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 18187. 
206 See id.
207 Id.
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many others, proved tolack meritbecauseJudgeRhodesalready
ruled that Michigan state constitutionality concerns were un-
founded. Ultim ately, a large portion ofthe objectionswere dis-
missed upon a finding thatthey wereeithertoovagueorsimply
unsupported by particular evidence to m ove the resultin the
creditor-objectors favor.208
Whileaddressingthem ostpotentofthecreditor-objectorcon-
cerns, Judge Rhodeslaid outa four-partanalysisto determ ine
whetherDetroithad m etthe requirementsforgood faith filing
under§921(c).209 Itisim portanttonote, however, thatnowhere
in theopiniondidJudgeRhodesstatethatthefour-partanalysis
he provided forconsidering § 921(c)good faith issueswastobe
understood as the definitive testmoving forward. Furthermore,
JudgeRhodescited otherprom inent§921(c)caseswhilesetting
up his test for Detroits good faith assessm ent.210 Therefore,
m uch of Judge Rhodess test is akin to past Chapter 9 assess-
ments,211 but Judge Rhodess test also explores deeper and more 
equitablefacetsassociated with theconsequencesofa dism issal
of a Chapter 9 petition under § 921(c). Judge Rhodess test offers 
a com pelling hybrid ofmany ofthe prom inent § 921(c)cases
whilealsoconsideringthecomplexity of Detroits bankruptcy case. 
A. Step One: Contemplation of Chapter 9 Relief
The first step in Judge Rhodess test was to ask whether the 
Citys financial problems are of atypecontem plated forChapter
9 relief.212 Atthis stage, Judge Rhodes argued that Detroits 
208 Id. at 183 (The Court finds, however, that in som e particulars, the 
record does support the objectors view of the reality that led to this bank-
ruptcy filing. Itis, however, notnearly supported in enough particularsfor
the Court to find that the filing was in bad faith.). 
209 Id.
210 Id. at187. The two prim ary casesJudgeRhodesused in establishing
his good faith analysis were Stockton and N.Y. City OffTrack Betting.
However, healsoused individualcasestosupporteach step ofhisgood faith
determination. See id. at 18789. 
211 The first two and arguably the first three parts of the Rhodes Test, 
havebeen exploredin previouscasesthataddress§921(c). However, looking
into the prejudice placed upon the citys residents was a largely unprecedented 
stepinChapter9 caselaw.
212 In re CityofDetroit, 504B.R. at187.
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financialsituation was exacerbated by the citys shortcomings, 
but that the citys problems were very rightfully in line with the 
typescontemplated forChapter9 relief.213 In theopinion, Judge
Rhodeswrote:
ItistruethattheCitydoesnothaveaclearpictureofitsas-
sets, income, cash flow, andliabilities, likelybecauseitsbook-
keeping and accounting systems are obsolete. Butthis only
suggeststheneedforrelief. Itdoesnotsuggestbadfaith. More-
over, as the Citys financial analysts subsequent m onths of 
work have sharpened the focus on the Citys finances, the re-
sultingpicturehasonlybecomeworse.214
Here, JudgeRhodesnoted thatmanyoftheobjectionspushed for
bythecreditor-objectorswerenotgroundedinindicationsoflack
ofgood faith, butmoreproperly expressed a m ultitudeofareas
wherethecityhasexperienced egregiousproblemsand shortcom-
ings.215 Moreover, JudgeRhodesconcludedthatChapter9 islikely
the only remedy thataffords the city the protection itneeds to
solvetheseissues.216 What is most important about Judge Rhodess 
analysis here is that he focused on the municipalitys objectively 
identifiable problemsthatcalled forChapter9 reliefand noton
thesubjectiveargumentspushedforwardbytheopposingparties.
B. Step Two: Consistency with the Remedial Purpose of Chapter 9
In his second consideration of Detroits good faith under 
§ 921(c), Judge Rhodes looked to see if the reasons for filing [for 
Chapter9]areconsistentwith therem edialpurposeofChapter
9.217 Judge Rhodes noted thatthe remedialpurpose soughtby
Detroit was to receive a breathing spell in order to establish a 
plan for adjustment.218 This language m irrors the highly sub-
jective219 elem entof§ 109(c)(4)in which a municipality m ust
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at189.
217 Id. at187.
218 Id. (quoting In re Cty. ofOrange, 183 B.R. 594, 607 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1995)).
219 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note69.
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desire[ ] to effect a plan to adjust such debts.220 Here, Judge
Rhodesdelved intoany possibleulteriorm otivesofthem unici-
palitys leaders and looked for em piricalevidence, ratherthan
guessingatthesubjectiveintentionsofthem unicipality.221
Judge Rhodes ultimately found that Detroits bankruptcy 
petition was filed for the exact reason of achieving a breathing 
spell so that it could adjust its debt.222 The creditor-objectors
argued that the citys endeavor toim pairthepaym entofpension
obligations was inconsistent with any remedial purpose for
Chapter9.223 However, JudgeRhodesreduced thisargumentto
sem anticsbyillustratingthatim pairingpension paym entswith
the help ofChapter 9 is, in the netresult, equivalentto dis-
chargingdebtowedtocreditors. Ultim ately, itisconsistentwith
alawfulavailm entoffederalbankruptcylaw.224
C. Step Three: Detroits Efforts to Improve the State of its Finances 
In exploring a third factorin Detroits good faith petitioning 
requirement, Judge Rhodes made a difficult determination of
whether the m unicipality had m adeeffortstoimprovethestate
of its finances prior to filing, to no avail.225 JudgeRhodesquickly
determined thatEm ergency Manager Kevyn Orr had gone to
considerable lengths in order to improve the m unicipalitys fi-
nances.226 Judge Rhodes noted that the efforts included reducing 
the number of City employees, reducing labor costs through
im plem entation ofthe City Em ploym entTerms, increasing the
Citys corporate tax rate, working to im prove the Citys ability to 
collecttaxes, increasinglightingrates, deferringcapitalexpend-
itures, reducing vendor costs, and reducing subsidies to the
DetroitDepartmentof Transportation.227 These efforts proved
220 11 U.S.C. §109(c)(4)(2014).
221 In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 18788. 
222 Id. at187 (quotingIn re Cty. ofOrange, 183 B.R. 594, 607 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1995)).
223 Id. at188.
224 Id. (citing In re Chilhowee RIV Sch. Dist., 145 B.R. 981, 983 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1992)).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id. at188.
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insufficienttostaveofftheinevitablebankruptcypetition, butthey
pavedthewayforhealthydecisionstobem adeunderChapter9
protections.228 Furthermore, Judge Rhodes reduced any argu-
m enttoan absurdity bystatingthatdeny[ing]Detroits oppor-
tunity to reorganize in chapter 9 based on lack ofgood faith
would betoignorefiscalrealityand thegeneralpurposesofthe
Bankruptcy Code.229
D. Step Four: Residents of Detroit Potentially Prejudiced
The biggest departure Judge Rhodes took in ruling on De-
troits § 921(c) good faith was in his final step, where he asked 
whether [t]he residents of Detroit will be severely prejudiced if 
this case is dismissed.230 JudgeRhodesnotedthatthisconsider-
ation was of paramount importance.231 However, thisconsider-
ation was unique to Detroits bankruptcy case. This uniqueness is 
likelyduetoalongstandingbankruptcyprinciplethatthedebtors
and creditors are the only parties with whom bankruptcy law
should concern itself.232 However, Chapter9 is once again dis-
tinctfrom otherformsofbankruptcyinthisregard. Thetruebene-
fit of considering the prejudice to the citys residents is that if 
thedismissaloftheChapter9 bankruptcywouldresultin preju-
dicetothem , then itvalidatesthenecessityforChapter9 relief.
Ultimately, the city of Detroits residents have benefited m ore
than anybody by Judge Rhodess decision to allow the city bank-
ruptcyprotection.
E. The Effects of Detroits Eligibility on the City 
With over one hundred parties actively opposing Detroits 
bankruptcy and challenging it from a multitude of angles, Detroits 
Chapter9 eligibilitywastenuous.233 Asmentionedabove, ifJudge
Rhodeshad taken an approach similartomanyotherChapter9
cases, which turned on thegood faith requirementunder§921(c),
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at189.
232 Plank, supra note 16, at 51618. 
233 Jacoby, supra note203, at853.
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then Detroit could have lost its only valuable opportunity for
recovery.234 However, the im portance of Detroits Chapter 9 
eligibility, in lightofpotent§921(c)challenges, isunm istakable
in how thecityhasusedthiseligibilitytoreviveitself.
Although Detroits bankruptcy exit plan was approved in No-
vem ber of2014, the positive effects of Detroits Chapter 9 eli-
gibility were felt alm ost im mediately upon Judge Rhodess 
decision. With perm ission togoahead, Kevyn Orrtook bold and
dram aticsteps to help the ailing city. The city received m uch-
needed flexibility because it could use the money saved from
paying offim mediate debtobligationson functionsessentialto
the citys operation.235 Theseoperationswould havebeen m uch
more difficult without Chapter 9 protection. One of Kevyn Orrs 
strongest moves as Detroits Em ergencyManagerwasappointing
a new ChiefofPolice.236 Heappointed JamesCraigand allotted
extra revenue to add more officers and provide better equip-
ment.237 Jam es Craig brought m uch-needed experience to the
position, asheformerlyservedasthechiefofpoliceforthecityof
Cincinnati.238 Due to these changes made under Orr and Craigs 
direction, crim ehasgonedown.239
Detroithasalsofound new lifewith increased industryfrom
sourcesboth old and new.240 Detroits fabled auto industry has 
234 Id.
235 See also CharlieLeDuff, The Americans with Charlie LeDuff: Detroits 
Bankruptcy is Helping Police Do Their Jobs, YOUTUBE (June26, 2014), https:/
www.youtube.com /watch?v=zOWG8Xq3dZA [https://perm a.cc/TAK3-3VLU]
(Ironically, because Detroit is bankrupt, Detroit police are doing better. Less 
moneybeingpaidtothecreditorsmeansmore money invested in the police.). 
236 Gena Damron & MattHelms, Detroits New Police Chief James Craig: 
Ive Come Home, DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 15, 2013), http://archive.freep
.com/article/20130515/NEWS01/305150098/Detroit-police-chief-Craig [http://
perma.cc/PG64-V7B7].
237 Id. Someofthemuch-neededfundscamefrom generousdonationsfrom
Detroits Big Three autom akers. GM, Ford, and Chrysler offered Detroit $22 
m illion to help revitalize the citys civic functions. Id.
238 Id.
239 BarbaraL. McQuade, U.S. Attorney: Violent Crime is Falling in Detroit,
DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2014
/10/10/m cquade-violent-crim e-falls-detroit/16992633/ [http://perma.cc/E8SA
-HDFB] (Detroit is on pace to have its fewest homicides in the city since 1967.). 
240 See Tim Alberta, Why Detroits New Mayor Thinks His City Is Poised for 
an Economic Reinvention, NATL JOURNAL (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.national
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found renewed success.241 The realestate marketin downtown
Detroithasseen asignificantspike.242 Em ploymenthasrisen.243
Recognizinghigherem ploymentrates, thepopulation hasbegun
to return.244 Even foreign investors have pinned their eyes on
Detroit as an inevitable comeback story.245 However, therecent
revitalization would likelynothavebeen possibleifDetroithad
notgonethrough bankruptcy.246 The comeback story may not 
have begun without Judge Rhodess part in Detroits bankruptcy. 
Indeed, Judge Rhodes went to considerable lengths to ad-
dress Detroits good faith petitioning in accordance with § 921(c). 
Such an in-depth analysis is unparalleled in other Chapter 9
cases. Yet it is inescapable that Judge Rhodess test is, at m ost, 
a judicially rendered guideline for conducting Chapter 9s good 
faith filing analysis. In its present incarnation, itis not, and
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likely willnotbe, mandatory authority thatothercourts must
follow. However, with a substantialgap in statutory authority
and silencefrom Congress, thereisperhapsnom orepracticable
or principled approach than Judge Rhodess test for determ ining 
Chapter9 eligibilityin lightofcreditor-objectorgood faith chal-
lenges. Therefore, untilamendments to the Bankruptcy Code
provide new statutory scaffolding for § 921(c)s good faith re-
quirements, Judge Rhodess test can stand out as particularly 
instructive. Itprovidesm anageablepointsofassessm entin the
good faith analysis and ensures that the best interests ofall
parties in a municipalbankruptcy case are being considered.
Municipalities and bankruptcy courts alike can look to Detroits 
casetofindapragmaticandprincipledapproach whereadearth
of legislative instruction and statutory authority has left a
substantialgapin bankruptcylaw.
CONCLUSION:SPERAMUS MELIORA |RESURGET CINERIBUS
The city of Detroits flag is em blazoned with two wom en ges-
turingtowardstwoverydifferentcityscapes. On theleft, asorrow-
fulwom an isfacing a burning city silhouette, which represents
the once-fallen Detroitafter the greatfire of1805. Below this
scene, the Latin words speramus meliora areinscribed, which
translates to we hope for better things. On the right, however, 
a woman with a m oreuprightand confidentpostureispointing
towards a lush, reconstructed cityscape. This picture sits atop
the Latin words resurget cineribus, which m eans it will rise 
from  the ashes. 
The imagery depicted in Detroitsflag isa fitting display of
the citys past and current hardships. Indeed, the last seven 
decades of Detroits history m ark the second tim e the city has
fallen. Thistime, the city suffered the slow burn ofineptitude,
failure, andcorruption.
However, throughout Detroits Chapter 9 bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, thecityhasbegun thelong, slow riseoutoftheashes.
Although the hardship isfarfrom over, the city ofDetroithas
taken significantstepssinceitwasafforded bankruptcy protec-
tion underChapter9. The year2014 m arked the arduousand
painfulprocess ofdebtrestructuring, butthe city found relief
andeven successthrough itsbankruptcyprotection.
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JudgeRhodesultimatelyruled that Detroits eligibility could 
notbethwartedbyitscreditors. Hisrulingconsideredfourm ain
principles. Eachoftheseprincipleshelpedpaintthelandscapeof
§ 921(c)s good faith requirem ent. However, before Judge Rhodes 
opined on them atter, theseconsiderationshad notbeen synthe-
sized intooneopinion and m ethodized within existing caselaw.
Histestcan bring a practicableand principled good faith stan-
dard to m unicipalbankruptcy proceedings. Now, othermunici-
palitiesand bankruptcy courtsalikecan look toIn re Detroit as
asignalofstabilitywithin an im preciseand precariousrealm of
bankruptcyjurisprudenceand America can look toDetroittofind
hopethatit, too, can findreason in wreckage.

